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Abstract
The proposed eavesdropping scheme reveals that the quantum communication
protocol recently presented by Bostr÷m and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] is
not secure as far as quantum channel losses are taken into account.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
After the pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard published in 1984 [1] a variety of
quantum secret communication protocols have been proposed (for a review see [2]). Although
there are differences among particular protocols, almost all of them realize the following
scenario. First, two strings of classical bits are generated by two legitimate users (Alice and
Bob) in some procedure involving transmission through a quantum channel. Then, with the
use of a public channel (classical, unjammable channel), each bit string is divided into two
parts – verification string and key. The public statistical analysis of verification strings allows
Alice and Bob to bound the amount of mutual information between them and a potential
eavesdropper (Eve). If this amount of information is too high, the key has to be thrown away.
In the other case the procedure of error correction and privacy amplification (also performed
2with the use of public channel) leads to the final key on which Eve's information is negligible.
Let us emphasize here two properties of the above presented general scheme. First, both the
verification string and the key are generated by essentially the same procedure. Secondly, this
scheme ensures generation of a random key only.
Recently, however, quite a different quantum cryptographic protocol has been
proposed by Bostr÷m and Felbinger [3]. Their the so-called "ping-pong" protocol allows
generation of a deterministic key or even direct secret communication. This improvement is
obtained via random switching between two distinct communication modes - message mode
and control mode. The key is generated in the message mode, while the eavesdropping is
detected in the control mode. The only parameter which has to be analyzed in order to detect
the eavesdropper is the correlation of bits generated in the control mode. The established key
is believed to be insecure if and only if the results of measurements performed in the control
mode coincide. The protocol have been claimed to be secure and experimentally feasible.
The security of the "ping-pong" protocol can be, however, impaired as far as the
realistic, not-negligible-distance implementations of this protocol are considered. Which
protocol can be considered as practical and secure was specified by Brassard, Lýtkenhaus,
Mor and Sanders : "In order to be practical and secure, a quantum key distribution scheme
must be based on existing - or nearly existing - technology, but its security must be
guaranteed against an eavesdropper with unlimited computing power whose technology is
limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics" [4]. The aim of our paper is to present an
eavesdropping scheme which allows Eve to obtain some information about the key without
any chance of being detected by a procedure proposed by Bostr÷m and Felbinger [3]. The
scheme works provided that quantum channel losses are not too low, even if perfect photon
sources and perfect detectors are used by Alice and Bob. The superiority of Eve over current
technology is restricted to the possibility of near lossless photon transmission and
3performance of two-photon CNOT gate on polarization qubits. Our scheme considers the
opportunity of eavesdropping arising due to a separation of two procedures, namely the
verification procedure and the key generation. Note that in the "ping-pong" protocol Eve
knows which mode (control or message) was chosen by Alice at the time when she could still
manipulate the travel photon. On the other hand, we have to confess that an attack can be
easily detected if the traditional form of verification involving some subset of the key (e.g.
QBER estimation) is performed.
Let us start with the brief description of the "ping-pong" protocol of Bostr÷m and
Felbinger [3] (see Fig. 1). Bob prepares two photons in entangled state
( ) 2/0110 +=Ψ+  of the polarization degree of freedom. He stores the first photon
(home photon), and sends the second photon (travel photon) through a quantum channel to
Alice. After receiving the travel photon Alice randomly switches between control mode and
message mode. In the control mode Alice measures the polarization of the travel photon and
announces the result in the public channel. After receiving Alice’s result Bob also switches to
the control mode,  i.e. measures the state of the home photon in the same basis and compares
results of both measurements, which should be perfectly anticorrelated in the absence of Eve.
So, the appearance of identical results is considered to be the evidence of eavesdropping and
if it occurs, the transmission is aborted. In the other case, the transmission goes on. In the
message mode, on the other hand, Alice decides which value { }1,0j∈  she will transmit to
Bob. She encodes this value with the use of the unitary operation jZ , where 1100Z −= ,
performed on  the travel photon. The travel photon is then send back to Bob, who measures
the state of both photons in the Bell basis. There are only two possible outcomes of this
measurement, namely +Ψ  or  ( ) 2/0110 −=Ψ− . Note that such a restricted Bell
4measurement can be easily performed [5]. The above result allows Bob to decode the
information send to him by Alice. +Ψ  encodes 0j = , while −Ψ  encodes 1j = .
Eve, of course, has no access to the home photon but can manipulate the travel photon
while it goes from Bob to Alice and back from Alice to Bob.  It was proved by Bostr÷m and
Felbinger [3] that the eavesdropping strategy which has zero probability of being detected,
does not provide any information about the key to Eve. The proof, however, does not take
into account the possible transmission losses. We will now present the effective
eavesdropping strategy which never produces the identical results of the measurements
performed by Bob and Alice in the control mode. The price which has to be paid by Eve is the
creation of additional losses in the transmission from Bob to Alice. These losses can be used
to detect eavesdropping in the case of ideal channel. On the other hand, in the realistic case of
lossy channel, Eve can replace the original channel by a better one and hide the
eavesdropping losses in the channel losses.
The lossy quantum channel is described by a single-photon transmission efficiency η .
In order to explain the construction of our protocol, let us first consider the case of the ideal
channel ( 1=η ). Eve uses two auxiliary spatial modes x , y  together with a single photon in
the state 0 . She attacks the quantum channel twice, for the first time during the transmission
from Bob to Alice (B-A attack) and for the second time during the transmission from Alice to
Bob (A-B attack). The eavesdropping protocol (outlined in Fig. 2) starts with preparing two
auxiliary modes x , y  in the state 
yx
0vac , where vac  denotes the empty mode. The state
of the whole system is thus
yxth
0vacinitial +Ψ= (1)
5when the B-A attack takes place. This attack consist of performing unitary operation Q on
three spatial modes t , x , y , where t  denotes the travel photon mode. The operation Q
defined as
yyxtxtyxt HCPBSSWAPQ = (2)
is composed of  the Hadamard gate,  SWAP gate and the three-mode gate which we call the
controlled polarizing beam splitter (CPBS). The possible construction of CPBS (presented in
Fig. 3) uses CNOT gates and a polarizing beam splitter which is assumed to transmit (reflect)
photons in the state 0  ( 1 ). The CPBS, when acting on the relevant states, performs the
following transformation



 →



vac11
0vac1
1vac0
vac00
1vac1
0vac1
1vac0
0vac0
CPBS
 . (3)
The B-A attack transforms the whole system to the state 
yxthyxt
0vacQAB +Ψ=−  of
the form
 
( ) ( )
yxtyxthyxtyxth vac0010vac12
1
vac1101vac0
2
1AB +++=−  .     (4)
One sees that the operation Q first transforms the auxiliary photon to a superposition of the
polarization states ( ) 210 +  and then sends to Alice one element of this superposition
conditionally on the state of the travel photon. The travel photon is stored by Eve. Suppose
now that Alice switches to the control mode and measures the state of the mode t .  Eq. 4 tell
us that with a probability 21  Alice detects no photon. However, if the photon is detected, its
state is perfectly anticorrelated with the state of the home photon. So, the probability of
eavesdropping detection based on the correlation observation equals zero. (The eavesdropping
6can be, however, still detected by the observation of the losses.) Let us now analyze the
performance of the protocol in the case of Alice operating in the message mode. After Alice
performs jtZ  operation an A-B attack takes place. The A-B attack consist of performing an
operation 1 yxtQ− . After this attack the state of the system ABZQBA jt1 yxt −=− −  is
( )
xythyth vac001j102
1BA +=−  . (5)
The final step of the eavesdropping protocol is a measurement of polarization performed on
the y - photon. The result of this measurement will be denoted k , while the result of Bob's
measurement will be denoted by ( )10m =  according to the ( )−+ ΨΨ  result. Let us rewrite
Eq. 5 in a more convenient form
( )ythythythyth 00jj21BA −+−+ Ψ−Ψ+Ψ+Ψ=−   . (6)
Eq. 6 allows us to write the probabilities mkjp  of possible measurement’s outputs for a given
value of j . The only nonzero probabilities are
81pppp
21p
111011101001
000
====
=
(7)
Assuming that Alice sends both values of j  with the same probability the mutual information
between any two parties can be calculated.
 
074.03log
2
35log
8
51I
311.0
3
4log
4
3II
22BE
2ABAE
≈−+=
≈==
(8)
One sees that mutual information between Eve and Alice equals to the mutual information
between Bob and Alice. One can also see that the eavesdropping induces QBER (given by
( )∑ +k 0k11k0 pp  ) at the level of 41 . Note that the scheme is not symmetric in that sense that
both the information obtained by Eve and the QBER depend on the value of the bit generated
7by Alice. Eve can remove this asymmetry by performing with probability of 21  the
additional unitary operation ytS  just after the operation 1 yxtQ− during the A-B attack. The
operation ytS  is composed of  Z , negation X and controlled negation CNOT, namely
tytttyt XCNOTZXS = . (9)
If the ytS  is performed the final state of the system 
( ) BASBA yt
S
−=−  is
( ) ( )ythythythythS 00jj21BA −+−+ Ψ+Ψ−Ψ+Ψ=−   . (10)
The symmetrization procedure does not touch the QBER, however, it reduces the mutual
information between Alice and Bob to the value
189.013log
4
3I 2AB ≈−= . (11)
So far, we have presented eavesdropping protocol which produces losses and errors
but indeed does not produce the correlated results in the control mode. The losses induced by
Eve can be, however, hidden in the channel losses. Suppose that Alice and Bob use a quantum
channel of η  not exceeding %50 . Typical values of η  for long-distance experimental
quantum key distribution well fit this range [6 - 8]. Eve can replace the original quantum
channel by a better one to double its transmission. If the transmission efficiency of Eve's
channel is η2  then the total efficiency (taking into account both channel and eavesdropping
losses) seen by Alice equals the efficiency of the original channel i.e. η . On the other hand,
the efficiency of the transmission Bob - Alice - Bob in the message mode should be 2η  not
24 η . So Eve has to  filter out %75   of the photons reaching the Bob in the message mode. In
this way the information about the eavesdropping is completely erased from the data
generated in the control mode. If the efficiency of the original channel η  exceeds %50 , the
undetectable eavesdropping is still possible, however, mutual information AEI  cannot reach
8the value given in Eq. 10. In this case Eve has to replace the original channel by the ideal one
and to eavesdrop only the fraction ( )η−=µ 12  of the transmitted bits. The values of the
mutual information AEI  and ABI  as functions of η  are presented in Fig.4. It can be seen that
the mutual information between Eve and Alice can exceeds the mutual information between
Bob and Alice up to almost %60  transmission efficiency.
Let us now consider how to improve of the "ping-pong" protocol to make it secure.
This can be done, e.g., in a traditional way by sacrificing some part of the key in order to
estimate QBER. Our scheme produces QBER equal to %25  which should be easily detected
as the QBER measured in the long-distance quantum key distribution experiments [6-8] does
not exceeds a level of a few percents. There is, however, another way to protect the "ping-
pong" protocol against eavesdropping. Note that Eve’s action depends on the actual Alice’s
choice of the communication mode (control or message).  If, e.g.,  she performs the A-B
attack in the case of switching to the control mode by Alice it could happen that both Alice
and Bob detect the photon in the travel mode. Such a “double” detection of the single travel
photon can be used as an additional evidence of Eve's action. Thus, Alice has to delay the
announcement of the information about a chosen mode. Bob, on the other hand, apart from
measuring of the home photon’s polarization has also to check if there is any photon in the
travel mode. In this way the detection of eavesdropping based on the analysis restricted to the
control mode can be achieved.
In conclusion we have presented undetectable eavesdropping scheme working on the
realistic implementation of the "ping-pong" quantum communication protocol. The
eavesdropping scheme works if the quantum channel losses cannot be ignored. It exploits the
fact that the "ping-pong" protocol is performed with the use of two distinct modes (control
and message mode), and moreover, that the information about which one of them is actually
used is revealed too soon, i.e. in the time when Eve still has access to the travel photon. We
9also suggest the way in which the original "ping-pong" protocol can be improved to fulfill the
conditions of both practicality and security.
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Fig. 1 The message mode and the control mode of the "ping-pong" protocol; h and t denote the
home and the travel photon, respectively.
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Fig. 2 Eavesdropping on the “ping-pong” protocol.
PBS
Fig. 3 Controlled polarization beam splitter (CPBS). The polarization beam splitter (PBS)
transmits (reflects) photons in the state 0  ( 1 ).
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Fig. 4 Mutual information between Eve and Alice AEI  and mutual information between Bob and
Alice ABI  as a function of quantum channel transmission efficiency η .
